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Introduction
There are few areas about which there is a greater
range of opinions among international monetary ex-
perts than the issue of exchange rate regimes. Emi-
nent economists can be found who support almost
any position. However, this range masks the substan-
tial amount of agreement among a broad majority of
serious students of international monetary econom-
ics. Even though economists might not agree on the
exact content of optimal policy strategies, they often
agree substantially about the wrong policies and the
dimensions of the ballpark for appropriate policies.
Disputes have been considerable about what Korea’s
postcrisis exchange rate policy should be and what it
has been. In an earlier version of this paper1 we ar-
gued that a serious application of the theory of opti-
mum currency areas suggests that the broad outlines
of Korea’s current exchange rate policy are quite ap-
propriate and that, although Korea should be very in-
terested in regional (and global) monetary coopera-
tion, this interest should not take the form of either
unilateral or joint fixing or pegging of the won ex-
change rate. In this version of our work, we focus
on what policy has been.
Although characterization of Korea’s exchange rate
policy might seem quite easy, this is not the case.
Korean officials often refer to current policy as a freely
floating exchange rate. This characterization meets
the definitions that have been offered by some classi-
fiers of exchange rate regimes.2 Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger classify Korea as fixed regime,3 and
McKinnon and Schnabl describe Korea and other Asian
countries as having returned to a dollar standard.4
Others conclude that Korea’s policy is described by
neither extreme, but rather is an intermediate regime
based on managed floating.5 After reviewing various
classification schemes and criteria, we conclude that
the best characterization of Korea’s policy is a man-
aged floating rate and suggest that at issue are not
just academic questions of nomenclature but also sub-
stantive issues of exchange rate management.
1. Thomas D. Willett, with the assistance of Yongbok Kim, “Assessing Korea’s Post Crisis Managed Float,” working paper no. 209
(Seoul: Bank of Korea, Institute for Monetary and Economic Research, 2004), http://210.104.132.11/contents_admin/info_admin/
main/home/bokdb/publication/occasion/occasion01/info/IMER209.pdf.
2. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics  119, no. 1 (2004): 1–48; and Kim Soyoung, Sunghyun H. Kim, and Yunjong Wang, “Fear of Floating
in East Asia” (paper prepared for Claremont-KIEP conference on Monetary and Exchange Rate Arrangements in East Asia, 2004).
3. Eduardo Levy-Yeyati and Federico Sturzenegger, “Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes: Deed vs. Words,” European Economic
Review 49, no. 6 (2005): 1603–35.
4. Ronald McKinnon and Gunther Schnabl, “The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Floating, and Original Sin,” Review of
Development Economics  8, no. 3 (2004): 331–60.
5. Michael Dooley, Rudi Dornbusch, and Yung Chul Park, “A Framework for Exchange Rate Policy in Korea,” in Korean Crisis and
Recovery, ed. David T. Coe and Se-Jik Kim (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund; Seoul: Korea Institute for International
Economic Policy, 2002); Leonardo Hernández and Peter J. Montiel, “Post-Crisis Exchange Rate Policy in Five Asian Countries:
Filling in the ‘Hollow Middle’?” Journal of the Japanese and International Economics 17, no. 3 (2003): 336–69; Park Yung-chul and
Charles Wyploz, “Exchange Rate Arrangements in East Asia: Do They Matter?” (paper prepared for Claremont-KIEP conference on
Monetary and Exchange Rate Arrangements in East Asia, 2004); Eiji Ogawa and Doo Yong Yang, “Exchange Rate Arrangement in East
Asia” (paper prepared for Claremont-KIEP conference on Monetary and Exchange Rate Arrangements in East Asia, 2004); and Tony
Cavoli and Ramkishen S. Rajan, “Have Exchange Rate Regimes in Asia Become More Flexible Post Crisis? Re-visiting the Evidence,”
working paper no. 519 (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2005).
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Classifying Korea’s Postcrisis Exchange
Rate Regime
There is no question that Korea’s postcrisis exchange
rate regime is based on a flexible or floating exchange
rate. Within this broad category exist many varieties
of regimes, however; and where in this range Korean
policy should be placed has been the subject of some
controversy. Recent research on exchange rate re-
gimes has taught us that official classifications can
often be misleading. China argues, for example, that
it has a managed float although its currency has re-
mained pegged to the dollar within a narrow range
since the mid-1990s. Calvo and Reinhart6 have labeled
such heavy management of officially flexible rates as
“fear of floating,” and they argue convincingly that
the shifts in recent years in official classifications of
floating rates have greatly overstated the true increase
in flexibility. Indeed, some experts, such as Ron
McKinnon,7 have argued that in Asia there has been
little real increase in flexibility since the crisis and that
most of Asia is best described as still being on a de
facto dollar standard. We argue below that this con-
tention is overstated.
Korea officially maintains that it is practicing a “free
float” but notes that official intervention is sometimes
used. This terminology is not consistent with the stan-
dard textbook definition of freely floating. Jeffrey
Frankel, in his recent classification of exchange rate
regimes, stated, “With a free float, the central bank
does not intervene in the foreign-exchange market.”8
Ito and Park refer to this “nonexistence of official
intervention” as the “fundamentalist” definition of free
floating.9
Seldom is such a pure free float followed in practice.
As Reinhart and Rogoff argue, “In reality, ‘pure’ float-
ing exchange rates are an artifact of economics text-
books. Even in countries where the exchange rate is
not an explicit target of policy, there are typically oc-
casional (relatively rare) instances where there is uni-
lateral or coordinated intervention in the foreign ex-
change market.”10 The United States, Canada, and, in
recent periods, Mexico would be examples of only
occasional foreign exchange market intervention. For
years New Zealand has been an exception and has
practiced a completely free float although the central
bank reserves the right to intervene if foreign exchange
markets should become disorderly.
The Reinhart and Rogoff study makes valuable con-
tributions to the literature on the classifications and
analysis of exchange rate regimes, but its treatment
of free-floating rates is open to the serious criticism
that it is based solely on the behavior of exchange
rates. Analytically, however, the degree of flexibility
of an exchange rate regime should depend on the de-
gree of exchange market pressure that it takes in the
form of changes in reserves versus changes in ex-
change rates. In a pure float, all change comes in the
exchange rate; and in a pure fix, all of it is taken as a
change in reserves. (Other policies such as monetary
policy and controls can also be varied to deal with
exchange market pressure, and, as will be discussed
below, this needs to be taken into account in the full
description of a country’s monetary policy-cum-ex-
change rate regime.) Where exchange market pres-
sure is strong, there can be both a lot of exchange
rate movement and a lot of intervention. Failure to
take this into account led Reinhart and Rogoff to er-
roneously classify Japan as a free-floating regime
6. Guillermo A. Calvo and Carmen M. Reinhart, “Fear of Floating,” Quarterly Journal of Economics  117, no. 2 (2002): 379–408.
7. McKinnon and Schnabl, “The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Floating, and Original Sin.”
8. Jeffrey Frankel, “Experience of and Lessons from Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging Economies,” in Monetary and Financial
Integration in East Asia: The Way Ahead, vol. 2 (Manila: Asian Development Bank; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 5.
9. Takatoshi Ito and Yung Chul Park, “Exchange Rate Regimes in East Asia,” in Monetary and Financial Integration in East Asia: The
Way Ahead, vol. 1 (Manila: Asian Development Bank; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
10. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation,”
working paper no. 8963 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002), 43.
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despite the record amount of intervention that was
undertaken.
Reinhart and Rogoff similarly classify Korea’s
postcrisis regime as free floating. However, the huge
increase in Korea’s international reserves indicates that
it, like Japan, while clearly following a floating as
opposed to a pegged-rate regime, is practicing sub-
stantially heavier management of its exchange rate than
countries such as Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, and
the United States. Of course, changes in reserves are
far from a perfect proxy for official intervention, but
with reserve accumulations so large, this seems like a
safe conclusion.
Somewhat surprisingly, the new behavioral Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) classifications of ex-
change rate regimes based on the judgments of IMF
staff place Korea in its most flexible category, which
they label “independent” floating. Such independent
floating is described as follows: “The exchange rate
is market determined; any foreign exchange interven-
tion aims at moderating the rate of change and pre-
venting undue fluctuations that are not justified by
the fundamentals, rather than establishing a level for
the exchange rate.”11 This they contrast with “tightly
or other managed floating” in which “the authorities
influence exchange rate movements through interven-
tions to counter the long-term trend of the exchange
rate, without specifying a predetermined exchange rate
path, or without having a specific exchange rate tar-
get (‘dirty floating’).”12 Their distinction between
“tightly” and “other managed floating” is not entirely
clear, but for the latter “the exchange rate is influ-
enced in a more ad hoc manner.” Even the distinction
between independent and managed floating does not
seem clear, however, because both “moderating the
rate of change” and “countering the long-term trend”
can be forms of “leaning against the wind” interven-
tion. In other words, under the IMF’s categories of
managed floating and independent floating, there could
be heavy or light exchange rate management. This
distinction (albeit subject to a fuzzy dividing line) is
more relevant for policy analysis.
The most blatant forms of beggar-thy-neighbor poli-
cies involve government-induced devaluations when
a country is running a balance of payments surplus.
The development of international monetary coopera-
tion in the post–World War II period has virtually elimi-
nated such blatant practices that were implemented
by some countries, including the United States, dur-
ing the 1930s. Today manipulation is usually more
passive and typically acts merely to reduce or halt
appreciations, not actively force major depreciations.
Such policies can still generate substantial disequilib-
rium, however, and thus may have an important in-
fluence on the international distribution of adjustment
pressures. With the substantial increase in exchange
rate flexibility since the 1970s, such issues have
become considerably less contentious than during the
days of the Bretton Woods adjustable peg system.
They are not entirely eliminated, however, and the
large reserve accumulations in Asia in recent years
have become the subject of a great deal of
commentary.
It is certainly wrong to suggest that exchange market
intervention by Asia is the major cause of the huge
U.S. current account deficits,13 but there is some le-
gitimacy to European concerns that the continuation
of such policies would place an excessive portion of
needed future exchange market and current account
adjustment on them. From this standpoint, it is not
clear whether greater concern should be focused on
China or Japan. Japan has allowed its currency to
rise against the dollar while China has not, but Japan’s
reserve accumulations have been greater. While quan-
titatively smaller, Korea’s accumulation of reserves
has been far from negligible as well.
11. Andrea Bubula and Inci Ötker-Robe, “The Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes Since 1990: Evidence from De Facto Policies,”
working paper no. 02/155 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2002), 15.
12. Ibid.
13. For evidence on this point, see Warwick J. McKibbin, Jong Hwa Lee, and Yung Chul Park, “The Transpacific Imbalance: An East
Asian Perspective” (paper presented at the Western Economic Association International session on Global Imbalances and East
Asia’s Exchange Rate Policy, 2004).
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In the case of both China and Korea, a substantial
increase in reserves in the postcrisis period was ex-
tremely sensible from both national and international
points of view. Recent crises have highlighted the
strong contributions of inadequate reserve holdings
to increased risk of crisis. However, Korea’s reserve
accumulations now appear to substantially exceed
prudent needs.14
Note that, where surrender requirements for foreign
currency proceeds are in place, reserves can be ac-
cumulated by the central bank without taking any
active measures in the foreign exchange market. From
an analytical point of view, however, the benchmark
of no substantive intervention would require the gov-
ernment or central bank to place the surrendered for-
eign exchange in the market rather than use it to ac-
cumulate reserves. The accumulated reserves would
place the same depressing influence on the value of
the currency whether the reserves were acquired ac-
tively through direct intervention or passively through
surrender requirements.
Other channels of indirect official influence on the
exchange rate are also possible. For example, Dooley,
Dornbusch, and Park suggest that “the Korean au-
thorities, it appears, have not resorted to the use of
reserves to moderate the movements of the nominal
exchange rate. Instead, they have relied on a few state-
owned banks to intervene in the market, using their
own holdings of foreign exchange, which are not
counted as part of the central bank foreign reserves.”15
It should be made clear that, in discussing govern-
ment intervention, we have been following the stan-
dard convention of assuming sterilized intervention
or its equivalent. There is of course considerable de-
bate about how effective such intervention can be in
influencing the exchange rate. Where capital mobility
is perfect, such intervention could work only through
signaling effects. There is substantial capital mobility
for countries such as Korea, but it is far from per-
fect; and it is usually argued that the foreign exchange
market for the won is relatively thin.16 Thus, it seems
likely that sterilized intervention can be effective, al-
though the extent of this should be the subject of
study.
Where intervention is unsterilized, it in effect implies
monetary policy actions, and there is no question that
this can have powerful effects on exchange rates (al-
though there is a debate about the possible existence
of a Laffer curve with respect to the effects of inter-
est rate increases). The question of how much weight
should be given to exchange rate movements in set-
ting national monetary policy is largely separate from
issues of strategies for unsterilized intervention. There
are some types of shocks for which sterilized inter-
vention would be the optimal response.17 The danger
is that sterilized intervention can also be used for other
purposes such as postponing needed adjustments; if
this becomes prolonged, it can create the precondi-
tions for currency crisis.
14. See Kim Jung Sik, Jie Li, Ramkishen S. Rajan, Ozan Sula, and Thomas D. Willett, “Reserve Management Policy in East Asia”
(paper prepared for Claremont-KIEP conference on Monetary and Exchange Rate Arrangements in East Asia, 2004).
15. Michael Dooley, Rudi Dornbusch, and Yung Chul Park, “A Framework for Exchange Rate Policy in Korea.”
16. On estimates of capital mobility for Korea, see analysis and references in Manfred Keil, Amnat Phalapleewan, Ramkishen S.
Rajan, and Thomas D. Willett, “Interest Rate Interdependence in East Asia” (paper prepared for Claremont-KIEP conference on
Monetary and Exchange Rate Arrangements in East Asia, 2004); and Thomas D. Willett, Manfred Keil, and Young-Seok Ahn,
“Capital Mobility for Developing Countries May Not Be So High,” Journal of Development Economics  68 (2002): 421–34.
17. See Thomas D. Willett, “International Financial Markets as Sources of Crisis or Discipline: The Too Much Too Late Hypoth-
esis,” Princeton Essays in International Economics no. 218 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, Department of Economics, May
2000, www.princeton.edu/~ies/IES_Essays/E218.pdf; and Thomas D. Willett, “Fear of Floating Needn’t Imply Fixed Rates: An
OCA Approach to the Operation of Stable Intermediate Currency Regimes,” Open Economies Review 14, no. 1 (January 2003):
71–91.
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We observe that at least some types of intermediate
exchange rate regimes tend to be more crisis prone
than the corners of highly flexible and hard fixed rates.
Drawing on an analysis by Jeffrey Frankel,18 we have
suggested in recent work that a major cause of the
tendency toward greater instability of intermediate
regimes is that they offer greater incentives for, and
fewer restraints against, prolonged inconsistencies
between exchange rate and domestic monetary or
macroeconomic policy.19 Thus the risk of generaliz-
ing currency crisis also needs to be considered. It is
clear that intervention to prop up a currency is more
likely to end in crisis than an equal sized intervention
to hold down a currency. However, as Park, Chang,
and Wang warn: “If the government intentionally makes
the currency cheap through foreign exchange inter-
vention in the name of foreign reserve accumulation,
this undervaluation will not be sustainable because
anticipated appreciation will continuously bring about
more capital inflows.”20 Such speculative inflows can
generate uncertainty and disrupt domestic monetary
policy. This has certainly become a problem for China.
On the basis of detrended monthly data from 1999:1
through 2004:6, the coefficient of changes in inter-
vention proxy (foreign reserves – interest earnings)21
on changes in the monetary base had a positive coef-
ficient of 0.05, but this was less than the standard
error. The coefficients on M2 and M3 were both nega-
tive and also insignificant. Thus, there is little indica-
tion in the raw data of intervention policy’s seriously
hampering the conduct of domestic monetary policy.
Statistical Description of Korea’s
Postcrisis Exchange Rate Policy
It has become widely recognized that in analyzing
exchange rate regimes we should not look at the be-
havior of the exchange rate alone. The variability of
an exchange rate could be low because of heavy offi-
cial intervention or because there are few shocks.
Thus, at a minimum, we need to look at the relation-
ship between exchange rate changes and interven-
tion. In the absence of publicly available information
on actual intervention, the imperfect proxy of changes
in reserves is often used.
Recent studies are all based directly or indirectly on
the concept of exchange market pressure, and they
consider how exchange market pressure is reflected
in the behavior of its various components. Thus, such
measures control for the size of shocks and focus on
the extent to which these are allowed to fall on vari-
ous policy instruments. We focus here just on the
exchange rate–intervention dimension.
Several studies have implemented this approach by
looking at the ratio of variances. This has two serious
problems, however.22 Where trends are important,
simple standard deviations and variances can give
misleading results. Furthermore, the concept of ex-
change market pressure is only well defined when
intervention is used to prevent or reduce exchange
rate movements. For many monthly observations,
however, reserve changes are found to reinforce rather
18. Frankel, “Experience of and Lessons from Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging Economies.”
19. See Willett, “Fear of Floating Needn’t Imply Fixed Rates.”
20. Park Yung Chul, Chae-Shick Chung, and Yunjong Wang, “Fear of Floating: Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy after the Crisis,” Journal
of the Japanese and International Economies 15, no. 2 (June 2001): 248.
21. Several studies (for example, Calvo and Reinhart, “Fear of Floating”; and Cavoli and Rajan, “Have Exchange Rate Regimes in Asia
Become More Flexible Post Crisis? Re-visiting the Evidence”) argue that interest earnings of foreign reserves are not part of
intervention. Intervention proxy in our study therefore is calculated by subtracting interest earnings proxy from foreign reserves. Our
formula is: Foreign reserves – U.S. Treasury bill rate × Foreign reserves in previous month
22. See Isriya Nitithanprapas and Thomas D. Willett, “Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes,” Claremont Colleges Working Papers in
Economics no. 2002-22 (Claremont, Calif.: Claremont McKenna College, 2002), http://econ.claremontmckenna.edu/papers/; and
Thomas D. Willett, Yongbok Kim, and Isriya Nitithanprapas, “Some Methodological Issues on Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes”
(paper presented at the annual meeting of Western Economic Association International, 2005).
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than reduce exchange rate movements. Because there
are different possible interpretations of these obser-
vations with “wrong signs,” we report our results for
correctly signed observations separately from those
for the total observations.
Two other important issues concern the time periods
and exchange rate measures to be used. For purposes
such as looking at effects on growth rates over long
periods of time, Reinhart and Rogoff’s method23 of
using five-year averages has much to commend it.
For studying the details of strategy under a managed
float, however, there may be frequent changes in
policy. Rather than basing calculations on arbitrary
time periods, we look for changes in relationships and
thus identify a number of subperiods. We contrast
our statistical analysis based on these subperiods with
a characterization for the full sample. We begin our
analysis of postcrisis behavior in 1999:01, after the
won had substantially completed its rebound from its
overdepreciation.
A problem for many countries is that more than one
foreign currency is important for their international
trade and financial relations. This had led to many
proposals for pegging to baskets of currencies and
surely indicates that undermanaged exchange rate re-
gimes focusing on just one currency can be less than
optimal and, in some cases, quite dangerous. We do
not address here the issues of the relative importance
of different exchange rates for the won,24 but we do
analyze the behavior of nominal and real effective
exchange rates for Korea (Figure 1). The result of
our analysis does not show any significant difference
across exchange rate measures in Korea.
In the framework developed earlier,25 intervention in-
dices indicate the degree to which authorities allow
pressures in the currency market to move the ex-
change rate versus intervening to damp its movement.
The following formulas summarize this idea.
where
T
e
 and T
r
 are estimated coefficients of time trends in
exchange rates and our intervention proxy (foreign
reserves–interest earnings), respectively Du
et
 and Du
rt
are the percentage change rates of the exchange rates
and intervention proxy, respectively.
23. Reinhart and Rogoff, “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation.”
24. On such issues, see Oh Junggun, “Exchange Rate Disparities and Needs of Policy Cooperation in East Asia” (paper presented at
WEAI conference, Vancouver, 30 June–3 July 2004); and Shin Kwanho and Yunjong Wang, “Trade Integration and Business Cycle
Co-movements: The Case of Korea with Other Asian Countries,” Japan and the World Economy 16, no. 2 (April 2004): 213–30.
25. Nitithanprapas and Willett, “Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes”; and Willett, Kim, and Nitithanprapas, “Some Methodological
Issues on Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes.”
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As their names imply, they measure two types of in-
terventions motivated by different goals. SPI is re-
lated with smoothing operation around the trend while
TPI is related with managing trend. When market
pressure is resolved entirely through the change of
exchange rate without any intervention, the indices
are 0. When market pressure is resolved only through
intervention, the indices are 1. Thus, the higher the
value of the intervention indices, the greater the pro-
pensity to intervene.
Our indices are composed of trend coefficients as
well as intervention indices. Because the natural loga-
rithm of exchange rate and reserves is used to calcu-
late intervention indices, the trend coefficients are in-
terpreted as monthly rates of change. These are trans-
formed into annual rates of change in the tables for
ease of interpretation.
It is not possible to adequately characterize the de-
gree of exchange rate flexibility with just one param-
eter. This is because we do not have any clear way of
equating the relationships of trends in exchange rates
with variability around trends. To help fix ideas, com-
pare a crawling peg with a narrow band with a fixed
peg with a wide band. Which is more flexible? We
don’t have an unambiguous theoretical rationale for
reaching an answer. Furthermore, shifts are frequent
in trends, or the base level of the exchange rate, or
both. Thus, our approach allows for trends in ex-
change rates and rates of reserve change, and it also
calculates the propensity to intervene around trend.
We further allow for shifts in trends and levels. There
is no unambiguous way to identify such shifts, and
how many shifts one is willing to allow will depend at
least in part on the purposes of the exercise.
This approach also gives us a crude method of at-
tempting to distinguish between reserve buildup and
exchange rate smoothing motivations for intervention.
With a clear delineation between the two objectives,
the reserve accumulation objective should be revealed
in the trend term and the smoothing objective in the
smoothing propensity to intervene. In practice, how-
ever, these motives are often combined through pat-
terns of asymmetric intervention via leaning against
the wind more strongly during periods of apprecia-
tion than during depreciation. Dooley, Dornbusch, and
Park26 describe an early version of Hernández and
Montiel27 as finding that Korea was not using reserves
for smoothing operations, but rather showed a sys-
tematic tendency to accumulate reserves over time. A
country can be doing both, however; and our esti-
mates suggest that this has been the case for Korea
(Table 1 and Figure 2).28
It is a significant characteristic of Korea’s foreign
exchange policy that there was a consistent and a
very large positive trend coefficient in the interven-
tion proxy regardless of movement in exchange rates.
Our estimates for TPI therefore have correct signs,
when exchange rates appreciated, in only two out of
four subperiods. This suggests that foreign reserve
accumulation was the primary objective, not manag-
ing the trend in exchange rates.
Because there has not been a strong long-term trend
in the won since its postcrisis recovery, our estimates
for SPI for the whole period coincide fairly closely
with the averages of those calculated for the indi-
vidual periods.29 SPIs for the fourth period, which is
the last and longest of the subperiods, are quite close
to those for the whole period, running a little above
0.5. We find much stronger smoothing intervention
in the second period (with a strong won), all running
between 0.7 and 0.8 for the dollar; while most of the
estimates for period three (a weak won) are consider-
ably lower, with around 0.4 being an average esti-
26. “A Framework for Exchange Rate Policy in Korea.”
27. Hernández and Montiel, “Post-Crisis Exchange Rate Policy in Five Asian Countries: Filling in the ‘Hollow Middle’?”
28. In the published version of their paper, Hernández and Montiel (Ibid.) make only the milder argument that the behavior of Korea’s
reserves is not consistent with smoothing operations only. Thus their analysis and ours are in qualitative agreement.
29. There are four main subperiods and three transition periods: subperiod 1 is 1999:1–1999:10, transition period 1 is 1999:11;
subperiod 2 is 1999:12–2000:10, transition period 2 is 2000:11–2001:2, subperiod 3 is 2001:3–2002:4, transition period 3 is 2002:5–
2002:6; and subperiod 4 is 2002:7–2004:6.
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mate. This period also showed much greater disper-
sion across the various estimates.30 With the excep-
tion of period two, the estimates of the intervention
coefficients run well below those for the precrisis
1990s. Table 2 and the work of Nitithanprapas and
Willett31 support the findings of a number of studies32
against the conclusions of McKinnon and Schnabl.33
The won has indeed been more flexible since the cri-
sis than it was before. Korea does display evidence of
fear of completely free floating, but such fear ap-
pears to be much less strong than would be implied
by a return to a de facto dollar standard.
It is interesting that most of the movements in the
won occurred during brief periods of substantial ap-
preciation or depreciation, with the trend rates of
change within periods being rather small. Our results
suggest a tendency toward asymmetrical intervention.
In period three (see Table 1), when the won was weak,
both the estimated trend rate of reserve growth and
the estimated coefficient of intervention around trend
are substantially lower than in all other periods. This
qualitative conclusion is robust with respect to all three
measures of the exchange rate and all four methods
of calculating the intervention coefficient.34
30. It shows that consideration of sign and trend is important.
31. Nitithanprapas and Willett, “Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes.”
32. Hernández and Montiel, “Post-Crisis Exchange Rate Policy in Five Asian Countries: Filling in the ‘Hollow Middle’?”; Park and
Wyploz, “Exchange Rate Arrangements in East Asia: Do They Matter?”; Ogawa and Yang, “Exchange Rate Arrangement in East
Asia.”
33. Ronald McKinnon and Gunther Schnabl, “The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Floating, and Original Sin.”
34. A month-by-month investigation of separate coefficients for intervention during periods of appreciation and depreciation is now
under way.
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The results do not provide strong evidence of a re-
serve target being met at some point with the ten-
dency to accumulate reserves falling after. While both
Table 1: Trend Coefficients and Intervention Indices for Bilateral Nominal Exchange Rate of
Korean Won against the U.S. Dollar, 1999–2004
     Period                                       Trend coefficienta                                     Type of datab,c                           Propensity to intervene
                                                 Exchange rate         Reserve                                                        TPI                       SPI
   Whole period
1999:1–2004:6 0.37 19.93 A (39/65) WS 0.53
B (39/65) 0.54
C 0.51
D 0.55
  Subperiods
  One
1999:1–1999:10 0.72 32.78 A (5/9) WS 0.67
B (4/9) 0.49
(Transition:5.7%)d C 0.60
D 0.62
Two
1999:12–2000:10 –1.28 30.82 A (6/10) 96.01 0.78
B (7/10) 0.80
(Transition:14.4%) d C 0.75
D 0.72
Three
2001:3–2002:4 1.25 14.91 A (9/13) WS 0.38
B (6/13) 0.50
(Transition:–10.1%) d C 0.40
D 0.57
Four
2002:7–2004:6 –2.28 24.61 A (13/29) 91.52 0.53
B (14/29) 0.53
C 0.55
D 0.51
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The trend coefficients are annual rates of change. A positive number for exchange rate means depreciation, and a positive number
for reserve denotes increasing reserve.
b. The numerator in parenthesis in this column is the number of observations of leaning against the wind; the denominator is the total
number of observations.
c. A: detrended and right signs, B: nondetrended and right signs, C: detrended and all signs, D: nondetrended and all signs.
d. Number for transition is the percent change in the exchange rate during the transition periods.
the trend and intervention coefficients in period four
are lower than in period two, they are substantially
higher than in period three.35
35. Note that the standard method of calculation of reserve changes in percentages will automatically yield lower estimates of the
trend rate of accumulation over time in the face of a constant rate of increase in absolute values. Because reserve levels tend to vary
much more than scaling factors such as gross domestic product and the monetary base and monetary aggregates, a constant ratio of
reserves to any of these variables would also likely generate a decreasing percentage rate of reserve accumulation. Thus, our failure to
find a decreasing trend suggests that during our sample period reserves had not yet reached the satiation level.
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The press has begun to report that the Bank of Korea
has started to worry that reserves have reached ex-
cessive (or certainly satisfactory) levels, but a behav-
ioral change in this direction does not show up in our
sample period, which runs through the middle of 2004.
Our standard public choice or bureaucratic theories
of exchange rate policy suggest that typical govern-
ments are often interested in keeping exchange rates
undervalued in order to promote short-run growth
and employment; central bank officials tend to have a
longer time horizon and give more weight to avoiding
inflation and future crisis. Again, press reports sug-
gest that such differences in view may have devel-
oped in Korea, and the Ministry of Finance and
Economy is reported to have lost around $1.8 billion
when it used commercial banks to intervene in the
derivative market of its own accord.
Concluding Remarks
Korea’s postcrisis exchange rate regime has been nei-
ther a free float nor a reversion to the heavy degree of
management of the precrisis periods. It has been a
managed float characterized by both considerable
exchange rate flexibility and considerable management.
This broad strategy of a managed float combined with
an inflation target—what Morris Goldstein has labeled
“managed floating plus”—has served Korea well. Of
course, actual developments have not been ideal. They
seldom are.
Exporters would clearly prefer for market forces to
have put less upward pressure on the won. But the
continuation of these pressures indicates that they
were not just the result of short-run destabilizing
speculations, and efforts to maintain a fixed level of
the won would have resulted in enormous inflationary
pressure. Substantial intervention to moderate the
appreciation of the won was quite justified. Much of
the initial appreciation was appropriate to correct for
overdepreciation in the midst of the crisis. Further-
more, the domestic economy was weak. Dooley,
Dornbusch, and Park suggest that “had the authori-
ties abstained from market intervention, the nominal
exchange rate might have appreciated much more than
otherwise, possibly choking off the recovery from
the crisis.”36 There was also a need for Korea to re-
build its levels of international reserves, which were
seriously depleted during the crisis. Indeed given
Korea’s substantial involvement with international
capital flows, a much higher level of reserves was a
sound national investment in future crisis prevention.
There can be too much of good thing, however. There
is no one exact scientific way to judge reserve ad-
36. “A Framework for Exchange Rate Policy in Korea,” 508.
Table 2: Trend Coefficients and Intervention Indices, May 1996–Oct. 1997
                   Trend coefficienta                                                          Type of datab,c                                               Propensity to intervene
     Exchange rate              Reserve                                                                                         TPI                              SPI
11.53 –9.28 A (10/17) 44.59 0.74
B (13/17) 0.81
C 0.75
D 0.72
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The trend coefficients are annual rates of change. A positive number for exchange rate means depreciation, and a positive number
for reserve denotes increasing reserve.
b. The numerator in parenthesis in this column is the number of observations of leaning against the wind; the denominator is the total
number of observations.
c. A: detrended and right signs, B: nondetrended and right signs, C: detrended and all signs, D: nondetrended and all signs.
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equacy in today’s world of substantial capital mobil-
ity, but a review of a number of benchmarks sug-
gests that these accumulations have substantially ex-
ceeded prudent levels37 and raises concerns that con-
tinuing increases are motivated more by mercantilis-
tic concerns or short-run stabilization policy objec-
tives (or both) than by prudent reserve rebuilding and
short-run smoothing intervention.
The substantial appreciation of the won in 2005 and
early 2006 has further highlighted the potential con-
flict in objectives. While some official statements have
indicated a belief that this recent appreciation has been
caused primarily by destabilizing speculation, many
commentators have suggested that it largely reflects
market fundamentals.
In summary, we believe that the adoption of a man-
aged float has served Korea well and that no funda-
mental changes in Korea’s exchange rate regime are
called for. There remain, however, a number of im-
portant issues from both Korean and global perspec-
tives concerning the best strategies for managing the
won’s float. Although we conclude that the evidence
is overwhelming that the most appropriate classifica-
tion for Korea’s postcrisis exchange rate regime is as
a managed float, how best to manage this float under
an ever-changing array of circumstances is not an
easy task.
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